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Introduction

The social etiquette that our society has imparted on the public has deemed conversations about sexual orientation too taboo to be part of mainstream discussions. When terms like
“queer,” “gay,” and “same sex” are used, people tend to become uncomfortable. Some individuals take it as a personal affront when others do not behave or dress in the ways that larger society has outlined as acceptable for each designated gender. When social norms -- how to dress,
what haircut to sport, who to hold hands with in public – are violated, not only is the person
who is not abiding by these social laws affected, but so are those who are witnesses to the violation of the norms and the social norms themselves.
The motivation behind this research lies in the belief that through opposing and disregarding the social norms that dictate acceptable behavior for those operating within larger society, those doing the opposing, or queering, can actually develop new space where they can create
new meaning for themselves. Over time, as history has repeatedly demonstrated, the prescribed
norms will eventually change or disappear entirely.
“Queer” describes members of sexual and gender minorities that are not heterosexual,
heteronormative, or gender-binary. These individuals operate outside the socially accepted, heteronormative constructs that dictate how one can dress and act in regard to his or her ascribed
gender. Someone who is queer possesses a biological sex, either male, female, or intersexed;
however, that person may or may not identify with the gender that is socially assigned to that
sex, or that person may deliberately choose to identify with a gender that is opposite of the one
that is socially assigned to his or her biological sex. The idea is that queer individuals are queer
exactly because they do not identify with what society expects.
For the purposes of this project, to “queer” pertains to actions that undermine socially
constructed and accepted gender conventions. Anything that does not identify with these norms
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is queering them. Queering is the intentional act that involves a person purposefully not identifying, acting, dressing, or behaving in ways considered to be in line with the gender associated
with a person’s original biological sex. The act of queering is entirely intentional. Each and every
person who lives within any given society has at least some indication of what are and are not
the accepted norms and conventions of that society. To decide to behave or act in ways that are
incongruent with society’s norms is a deliberate act of queering. This is not to suppose that the
impulse to queer is entirely voluntary; sexual orientation and gender identification are not clear
choices for some individuals. But the decision to act on the involuntary impulses is intentional,
making the act of queering an intentional one.
To queer socially accepted norms and conventions does not necessitate homosexuality;
however, homosexual people can and do queer socially accepted conventions. Take, for example,
the notions behind traditional relationships and marriage. The dynamics of homosexual relationships completely undermine what our society has decided an acceptable marriage should
look like. In other words, not everyone who queers social conventions is gay, but all gay people
queer social conventions.
In order to stay true to the rhetorical foundation of this research, it is necessary to define
significant key terms. Rhetoric, according to Aristotle, is the faculty of observing in any given
case the available means of persuasion. Traditionally, rhetoric is the art of speaking and writing
effectively to achieve a certain goal; however, rhetoric also encompasses our behavior and actions that work to achieve particular objectives. Rhetoric is a discourse that involves how we invent arguments and then deliver them in ways so that they can be as effective as possible. For
instance, the ways in which each person is who he or she are is how he or she decides to present
himself or herself to the rest of the world is a form of rhetoric.
The phrase “a rhetoric of...” signifies a certain kind of language, expectations, and behaviors associated with particular people, events, schools of thought, etc. Scholars from a vast array
of disciplines apply this phrase to many topics, both academic and non-academic. By saying
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there is a rhetoric of something, researchers can identify a group of people, an event, a process,
basically anything that possesses a specialized set of norms, conventions, and jargon, and then
report on how the people within that group interact with and interpret happenings both within
and outside the group. Therefore, by suggesting that there is a rhetoric of queer, I assert that
there exists something that encompasses a group of people and processes that subvert social
conventions by queering them in ways that change both the person doing the queering and the
convention being queered, and by doing so, the people doing the queering bring new meaning to
themselves and to the social conventions. The act of queering is an intentional response to the
social institutions that aim to dictate how individuals should look and behave. These acts lend
themselves to be read from a rhetorical perspective where notions like invention and delivery
come into play.
Queering social conventions is a rhetorical act. Choosing to abide or to not abide by social conventions represents invention – as in having the initial ideas to subvert the conventions
– and it is then delivery when the convention is queered and the person doing the queering presents him or herself to the rest of society. The people who are doing the queering are basically
delivering their argument, or presenting to the rest of society either how they see themselves or
how they wish to be seen. The consequences of queering can be both positive and negative. Individuals who are queering the social conventions can potentially experience ridicule, criticism,
and ostracism from individuals or groups who identify with the heteronormative side of society.
In her text, In a Queer Time and Place, Judith (J. Jack) Halberstam discusses two specific instances that involve people who queered social conventions, which ultimately lead to their tragic
ends at the hands of those who felt threatened by their queering.
There can be more positive outcomes as well. When enough people decide to queer a social convention, the convention itself becomes less important and those queering can begin to
experience more freedom within larger society, perhaps without ridicule, criticism, and ostracism. For instance, compared to a hundred years ago, society is much more accepting of women
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wearing pants or other articles of clothing that would have then been considered too masculine
for women to wear. Further, over time, there is the potential for the social convention to be
changed in ways that are more inclusive of people who choose not to live within the constrains
of heteronormative social norms. This evolution of norms and conventions has happened numerous times over the years. Some of the most prominent examples include the abolition of
slavery, women’s suffrage, and civil rights. All of these represent times in history when minority
groups opposed popular opinion, resulting in a significant change in what were then the current
socially accepted norms.
Popular opinion regarding homosexuality and queering commonly accepted social
norms is experiencing changes, albeit slow coming. In the United States, nine states have legalized gay marriage, and popular media has played a large part in helping sway society’s perceptions of queerness. For instance, in the past fifteen years or so, several television programs have
involved plot lines and characters that queer social norms, and they have experienced tremendous success. Will & Grace, a program featured on NBC beginning in 1998 and airing for eight
seasons, is probably the single most successful television show that featured gay principal characters. The lead gay roles both identified with and opposed gay stereotypes: one gay male character was a successful attorney who would otherwise seem heterosexual, while another gay male
character portrays the more flamboyant, colorful qualities that are more stereotypical of gay
men.
Another television program that is starting to amass a large following is NBC’s The New
Normal. This show follows an openly gay couple that is interested in starting a family. In order
to do so, they hire a surrogate to carry their child for them. The characters in the show encounter several obstacles, including public ridicule, because of the lifestyles they have chosen and decisions they make. The main message of the show can be summed up neatly by the programs
title: there is a new kind of “normal,” or the notion that there is a “normal” is becoming obsolete.
This is a topic that J. Jack (Judith) Halberstam also addresses this topic in her new text Gaga
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Feminism. She argues that the notion of what constitutes “normal” is fluid and in constant
change; public opinion about what makes up a “family” is transitioning. In all, it is important to
recognize that the trials and tribulations that the people Halberstam talks about in her book and
the characters in these television programs endure all shape how they behave, whether in line
with social constructions or not. It is important to note again that while these television programs portray homosexual lifestyles, it is not simply because the characters are gay that the
shows are relevant examples of queering; the two are not always necessarily tied. However, since
these lifestyles are not exactly in line with popular norms that dictate relationships, they are
queering the norms.
It is my position that the ways each of us perform our gender should be considered rhetorical performances, our different ways of situating ourselves among the rest of society. We deliver how we perceive ourselves to the surrounding world through the ways we dress, the language we use, and the lifestyles we choose to live. There are those who live their lives congruently with norms and mores that society outlines for us – dressing according to ascribed gender,
being in heterosexual relationships, etc. – and for the most part society leaves these individuals
alone. For those who choose not to live according to what society deems acceptable, to subvert
those conventions imposed on the public by society, there is a greater risk of ridicule, ostracism,
and sometimes a significant difference in legal rights.
However, there is an interesting – and generally overlooked – occurrence that happens
when socially constructed, heteronormative norms are subverted: the individuals doing the subverting – who should be experiencing significant limitations as a consequence of their actions –
actually find they have more room to make new meaning of the route they have chosen. Consider cross dressing: the biological female who chooses not to dress like a woman today has exponentially more opportunities to dress however she wants because she is queering the social
convention of how society expects her to dress. If she is already choosing to ignore the conven-

6
tion and not dress in the ways society tells her she should, she can then dress as she pleases because she will already not be identifying with the conventions.
J. Jack Halberstam makes a similar argument in Gaga Feminism. When discussing the
end of “normal,” she states, “ I am trying to show that once you stray from representational
modes dependent upon human forms and all the cliché-ridden formulae that they entail, surprisingly new narratives of life, love, and intimacy are bound to appear” (67). She goes on to
suggest that the social conventions that our domestic culture has relied upon to dictate what it
means to be “male,” “female,” “normal,” or “family” are really just placeholders that we cling to
for security; they hold no intrinsic value. In her opinion, feminist and queer theories should not
necessarily try to fix the categories, nor try to change them to be more inclusive of the changes
that happen daily, and instead should try to throw the categories out entirely. However, she
notes that our society is not necessarily capable or ready for such a social revolution:
Out in the mainstream marketplace of ideas, a place badly in need of oldfashioned as well as newfangled feminisms, best-selling books are still telling
straight women how to get men and how to marry them, and telling men how and
why they should become properly domesticated. (Halberstam 67)
Queering social conventions makes it possible to create new meaning for those who are
queering and new meaning of the norms that are being queered, even to the point where the
convention can be eventually erased and made irrelevant. The ways in which people are able to
queer things are limitless. Language can be queered by using, or not using, gendered pronouns
to refer to people belonging to each biological sex group. It all relates back to the notion of gender performativity, or “doing” gender. This idea comes from Judith Butler’s text, Gender Trouble. Gender performativity lends itself to the interpretation of delivery from a rhetorical perspective. It is also important to note that individuals need not be homosexual in order to queer social
conventions. For instance, heterosexual couples who choose to live together and raise children
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without being legally married go against what society has deemed acceptable for such living
situations.
In the sections to come, I will argue that instead of pigeonholing themselves by subverting socially constructed, heteronormative norms, individuals choosing to operate outside social
conventions can actually create new and different meanings of the conventions for themselves.
The next section will examine the foundations of rhetorical training and the ways in which
young men would shape and develop their public identity through training in rhetoric in accordance to the accepted social norms of the time and location. Next, I will explore the theories behind social norms, their construction, why they are so important to us as a culture, and why it is
such an ordeal when they are subverted or not followed. These notions lead into the next chapter, which will address and investigate what it means to queer things, whether queering something is intentional or not, and why it matters. Finally, all of this research will culminate in a final section that will introduce the rhetoric of queer. This section will discuss language use, rhetorical elements of queering – invention, delivery, etc -, and gender performativity.
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2

Ancient Rhetoric & “Making Men”

Socially constructed norms that outline preferred and acceptable behavior have been
alive and well for thousands of years. The inhabitants of ancient Greece and Rome were no
strangers to both explicit and implied social rules that governed what they should wear, who
they should associate with in public, and even the pitch they should use when speaking aloud.
However, some of the most notable norms of this time period dealt with common perceptions of
gender, especially when it came to raising young men.
Formal training in rhetorical studies was a privilege reserved for only the male children
of elite families. Men or boys with origins in the working class or below and women were entirely shut out from any kind of formal education. In the introduction to her book, Making Men,
Maud Gleason poses an insightful question about the hypocrisy of keeping women away from
schooling in ancient times: “My interest in the sociology of elite education developed in response
to a demoralizing paradox of my own education: how can the elite university manage to incorporate itself as a meritocracy while excluding women from power?” (xii). Though the inequalities
between men and women in academia are slowly disappearing, there is no question that gender
norms and stereotypes still weigh heavily in favor of the heteronormative men’s perspectives. It
would have seemed safe to assume that more progress would have been made over the past couple thousands of years since ancient Grecian and Roman times, but alas, women are still actively
fighting today for equal pay for equal work. The current state of our society is actually rather
similar to Gleason’s impression of how things worked back then: “the ancient world was not a
gender neutral place” (xiv). In other words, gender plays a significant role back then as it does
today, and in both time periods the ways people manipulate gender has an impact on how they
see themselves as well as how others see them.
However, in order to properly analyze the ways in which social norms impact life today,
it is crucial to examine where notions like these may have originated. Further, for the sake of
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this research, it is vital to examine how gender was treated in ancient Greece and Rome, and ask
questions to determine what role rhetoric played in creating and maintaining gender systems.
This is important because this was also the birthplace of rhetoric and where the notions of developing one’s identity through rhetoric first began. When thinking about these ideas, several
questions crop up: what did it mean to be a “man” and a “woman” in ancient Greece and Rome?
How was gender structured? What kind of impact did gender roles have on people’s day-to-day
life?
Maud Gleason argues that all “human societies tend to organize gender differences into
kinesthetic systems for communication and display. One has to learn to move like a gendered
human body” (Making Men xxvi). As previously noted, ancient Rome and Greece were not exceptions to this; within those societies were norms that structured what it meant to be a man or
a woman, but in these places at that point in history, only the males really possessed a gender
that mattered, and these “men” had to have the qualifications that were truly manly in order to
be acknowledged as such within their communities. A binary gender system similar to the one
that is prominent in our society today was in effect in ancient Rome and Greece, but there were
also degrees of masculinity and femininity that could either help or hinder one’s public gender
identity.
In other words, “the essential idea here is that there exists masculine and feminine
‘types’ that do not necessarily correspond to the anatomical sex of the person in question” (Gleason 58). This idea is one of the reasons why a formal training in rhetoric often included a heavy
emphasis on practicing avoiding mannerisms that would come off as feminine. In both ancient
Rome and Greece, rhetoric played a significant role in socializing and developing young boys
into what would be considered the “ideal” man, someone who would be a brilliant representation of all that their culture stood for. Gleason outlines this process as follows:
The rhetorical performer embodied his civilization’s ideal of cultivated manliness.
The young men who consciously studied his rhetorical exempla unconsciously
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imitated the gestalt of his self-presentation. The result was, for many generations,
the smooth-flowing cultural reproduction of the patterns of speech, thought, and
movement appropriate to a gentleman. (xxiv)
In a very important way, these kinds of practices were how cultural traditions and capital were
upheld and passed on. Further, through this kind of traditional upbringing that only those from
elite lineage experienced, these young men were able to develop their own public identities that
they would then demonstrate through carefully practiced rhetorical declamations.
Though there was a sort of binary gender system in effect, the notion of having a gender
from the moment of birth was not an idea that the ancient Greeks or Romans subscribed to. Instead, gender, and more specifically, "masculinity in the ancient world was an achieved state,
radically underdetermined by anatomical sex” (Gleason 59). However, the process of achieving
this state, did indeed begin in infancy, starting with molding and encouraging certain physical
attributes. Greek physicians had practices of instructing nurses to poke, prod, pull, and swaddle
infants in various ways and with diverse techniques in attempts to promote round heads, wellshaped noses, and the perfect hourglass shape for baby girls (Gleason 71).
These kind of customs were carried on through the branches of rhetorical training for
baby boys:
The process of forging masculine deportment that could begin as early as infancy
continued during literary education, when the linguistic mastery that was the exclusive prerogative of upper-class males was attained under pain of physical punishment at the hands of the grammaticus and under pain of social humiliation in
the school of the rhetor (Gleason 72).
Once the rhetorical training would begin for these young boys, one of the most important lessons that they would be taught was to avoid imitating or showing any kind of characteristic or
quality that was usually reserved for women, or that would make them seem effeminate.
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Gleason makes a point to list several of the most significant rhetorical teachers of the
time, like Quintilian, and the specific mannerisms and characteristics that they forbid their pupils to use. Some of these included: tilting one’s head to one side, shifting one’s gaze, carrying
one’s hands with palms turned upwards, melting glances, and rapid eye movement. These qualities or gestures were generally avoided by young men because they were thought to make them
seem more feminine, which was the absolute worst thing a young rhetorician could do.
According to Gleason, the common thought in the ancient world that men were superior
to women was not always exactly explicit; many times these kinds of sentiments come through
in the teachings of what young men should not do, like the list above, so they would not seem
womanly, or effeminate. In fact, on the other end of the spectrum, women or eunuchs (men who
do not possess the physical attributes that necessitate manliness) were shamed and ridiculed
when they came off as trying to be more masculine than society wanted them to be:
Since the secondary sex characteristics (particularly the hair and the voice) are
“read” socially as signs of the inner heat that constitutes a man’s claim to physiological and cultural superiority over women, eunuchs, and children, those who
tampered with the most visible variables of masculinity in their self-presentation
provoked vehement moral criticism because they were rightly suspected of undermining the symbolic language in which male privilege was written. (Gleason
70)
Through this reasoning it seems clear that both ends of the spectrum would be held in contempt
if socially constructed norms that governed gender were not observed accurately.
Women maintained a significantly inferior position than men did in ancient Rome and
Greece: young women were not afforded the same access to education that young men were, and
when the men were trained to speak publicly, they were repeatedly warned to avoid feminine
traits because they would cause the audience to believe they were less manly. In fact, some rhetorical scholars of the time strongly suggested that men should never learn to speak as equals
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with women for fear that some of the femininity from the woman would somehow rub off on the
man. Gleason outlines this common thought at follows:
Intimacy with a woman on equal terms affect both the manner and the matter of
his speech: “And if he talks, all he will be able to talk about is weaving and wool,
since his tongue has been discolored by the quality of women’s speech.” (100)
It is interesting here that there was less of a concern for the woman to pick up any hints of masculine speech, though perhaps this is because women were already always consider the lesser
sex, so a common assumption would probably have been that the woman would not be intelligent enough to do so. Even further, there was no expectation for women to cultivate the skill of
public speaking in the first place.
The scholarship available about how society was conducted in ancient Rome and Greece
clearly outlines gender norms that aimed to keep women in an inferior position to men at all
times, but especially in academic arenas like rhetoric. In Making Men, Maud Gleason sums up
this notion, saying, “In a value system that prized rhetorical skill as the quintessential human
excellence, and in a society structured so that this perfection could be achieved only by adult
males, arbiters of rhetoric were also arbiters of masculine deportment” (104). In other words,
those who succeeded in rhetoric were prized possessions that were highly valued in those cultures and the only ones allowed admittance were males from elite social classes, making the pool
of potential candidates incredibly narrow. Unfortunately, as previously noted, though there has
been progress for women since then, women are still struggling to find equality with men in social and workplace situations.
This last point is pointedly significant because of the socially constructed nature of gender itself, even thousands of years ago in the ancient world. How is it that, as thoughtful and
high-functioning humans working in societies, we continue to construct systems of norms, like
gender, that maintain such inequality? The next section focuses on these kinds of questions and
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takes a look at norms through a sociological perspective to examine how the norms are produced and maintained in society, and to what or who’s purpose they ultimately serve.
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3

Sociological Perspective

Societies and cultures across the globe are all defined and governed by understood
norms. These norms are drastically different from culture to culture, from one side of the world
to the other. The smallest native tribes in Papua, New Guinea can have their own sets of norms
that are entirely separate from the larger societies living in areas in nearby Indonesia or neighboring Australia. Customs that would seem perfectly natural to those living in the United States
may be offensive or ludicrous to people living in Northern Africa.
Sociologists have long debated how norms emerge, how they change, and why or
whether they influence a person’s behavior. Some important questions that crop up when discussing norms include: how do norms play a role in day-to-day life? How do norms contribute to
how people shape the way they see themselves as members of a given society? There are no
straight forward, plain answers to these questions; however, this section aims to examine the
different theories and perspectives regarding this topic that have been proposed by leading
scholars in sociology, and to try to make connections between the theories behind social norms,
the accompanying specialized rhetoric, and queering.
According to an article published by the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy co-written
by Cristina Bicchieri and Ryan Muldoon, social norms can be defined as customary rules that
govern behavior in groups and societies (Bicchieri 1). The authors touch on a major assumption
of social norms:
It is unquestionably assumed that norms elicit conformity, and that there is a
strong correlation between people’s normative beliefs and their behavior. By
normative beliefs is usually meant individual or collective beliefs about what sort
of behavior is prescribed (or proscribed) in a given social context. (Bicchieri 1)
The authors go on to explain that, for the most part, norms come paired with a degree of expectation for others in the given group, community, or society to also abide by the norms. In fact,
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the notion of collective expectations of action is one of the few things that the assorted theories
do agree on. Contemporary sociology acknowledges three prominent theories regarding the
creation and maintenance of social norms: 1) the theory of the socialized actor, 2) theory of social identity, and 3) theory of rational choice.
The theory of the socialized actor, posited mainly by Talcott Parsons, suggests that an
individual acts based on choices among several alternatives. The literature goes on to propose
that norms influence daily behavior and actions because they have been instilled in people since
birth, generally through their parents or other family members. Bicchieri and Muldoon outline
Parson’s theory, stating, “Conformity to standing norms is a stable acquired disposition that is
independent of the consequences of conformity. Through repeated socialization, individuals
come to learn and internalize the common values embodied in the norms” (1). Parsons believes
that these socialized actors act “according to roles that define their self-identity and behavior”
(Bicchieri 1).
While this perspective seems logical and points out how people become acquainted with
the norms at a very early age, it does not explain how the norms get started in the first place.
Further, this kind of theory is difficult to prove or observe in larger society because there may
not be a strong relation between what people claim they should do and what they in fact do.
Social identity theory is the second theory of social norms that is widely accepted.
Bicchieri and Muldoon define this approach as follows:
By “social identity” we refer, in Tajfel’s own words, to “that part of an individual’s
self-concept which derives from his knowledge of his membership of a social
group (or groups) together with the value and emotional significance attached to
that membership. ([Tajfel 255] 1)
In other words, individuals attach their identity and value to that of a larger group. Therefore,
norms, while they are not behavior in and of themselves, are common attitudes about how people in the group should behave. The authors suggest that by complying with the implied norms
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supported by one’s group or society, a person is demonstrating his or her allegiance and good
standing within the group, which then allows for that person to reap the positive benefits of being a group member.
One of the biggest differences between social identity theory and the theory of the socialized actor is the former does not claim that norms need to be internalized in order to affect action among individuals. In fact, in the theory of social identity, it makes more sense that a person would behave congruently with the accepted social norms in order to create or to maintain
whatever identity he or she desired instead of abiding by any norm for the sake of the norm itself. This notion brings about an interesting perspective to look at how norms change.
According to the theory of social identity, an individual would be compelled to act in
compliance with norms in order to fulfill an image of some societal identity, not because the
norms are part of an internalized psyche that has been developed since infancy. If that is the
case, then new norms can emerge and be accepted by society simply through a combination of
change in popular opinion and external pressures. Bicchieri and Muldoon give the example of
the image of the ideal man in the fifties:
In those years a popular icon was a Humphrey Bogart type that, among other
things, was never observed without a cigarette in his mouth. Now it means leading a healthy lifestyle that may include running, vegetarianism, and abstinence
from drinking and smoking. (1)
The same could be said about women’s roles, which have also changed dramatically over the
past sixy years. Both of these examples, along with many more adequately demonstrate the fluidity of social norms and customs.
The theory of rational choice, last of the prominent theories addressing social norms,
maintains that “since norms are upheld by sanctions, compliance is a utility-maximizing strategy. Provided that conformity to a norm attracts approval and transgression disapproval, con-
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forming is the rational thing to do, since nobody willfully attracts discredit and punishment”
(Bicchieri 1).
While all of these theories go into detail about how and why people may abide by social
norms, none of them really address how the norms emerge in the first place. Bicchieri aims to
address this by positing that there are three ways in which norms emerge: 1) biologically, 2)
cognitively, and 3) through structured interactions. The first makes sense when discussing
small, incredibly tight-knit groups, like the isolated tribes of Papua, New Guinea; community
members would somehow biologically share instincts that they would then transform into commonly held and accepted norms. Unfortunately, this approach does not account for norms in
larger communities or societies where not everyone is familiar with one another. The second
perspective, the cognitive approach, suggests that norms emerge after repeated interactions between people – defectors, punishers, and non-punishers - which would result in conditional, unstructured strategies that would ultimately translate into social norms. The last theory, the
structured interaction approach, argues that social norms emerge from simple cognitive processes - like imitation - and structured interactions. In other words, norms compete and evolve
based on which ones are easiest to abide by and have best benefits (Bicchieri 1).
All of these theories about how social norms materialize and are maintained have at least
one thing in common: there is always a degree of expectation. This can come in the form of society’s expectations of how its constituents should behave, or how individuals expect their peers to
act, or how people believe society expects them to conduct themselves. Here is the point where
acts of queering social norms complicates things. In her discussion of Parsonian norms,
Bicchieri suggest that some norms are so internalized that it is not until they are violated, or
queered, that their existence is realized (1). Some of the norms that dictate how ascribed genders
should act belong in this “internalized” category.
Although norms may be so ingrained in the subconscious of society and continue to persevere from generation to generation, that does not always mean that they are always well liked.

18
Bicchieri and Muldoon state, “Moreover, though a particular norm may persist (as opposed to
emerge) because of some [perceived] positive social function it fulfills, there are many others
that are inefficient and even widely unpopular” (1). This last statement rings true of many of the
current norms that aim to constrain how people express gender, who they want to marry, and
what kinds of families they want to have. Due to their ingrained and sometimes subconscious
nature, norms have the propensity to shape the way we as individuals develop our self-images,
whether it be in compliance with the dictations of the norms or not. Unfortunately for these
people who feel as though the norms do not adequately or accurately encompass how they see
themselves, the only choices they have are to try to fit into molds that do not represent them
well, or queer them.
However, as we have seen in this section and will continue to see in those following, social norms do have the capacity to change and, in many instances, they have changed over an
extended period of time. Earlier, in the discussion of rational choice, a particular quotation
stated, “nobody willfully attracts discredit and punishment” (Bicchieri 1). However, in some instances of gender queering or queering other social norms, the act of queering itself is the only
way to challenge the norm in hopes of eventually changing the norm or abolishing it entirely,
and most of the time, these deliberate acts of opposition attract discredit and punishment.
In terms of changing norms, Bicchieri takes quite a logical and apparently simple position. She argues that over time “each instance of strategy adjustment represents a new generation of agents coming into the population, with the old generation dying simultaneously”
(Bicchieri 1). This seems to be the path that most socially constructed norms take: one generation has a certain take on a particular topic, then their children grow up hearing their parents
opinions, and while some of them adopt everything they hear, others rebel to some degree, and
changes in popular opinion begin. One specific example of this includes the increased acceptance of visible tattoos on people in careers where once a “professional” appearance absolutely
did not include tattoos. The same could be said about gay and lesbian relationships; over the
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past couple decades, popular media has begun to portray gay and lesbian relationships during
primetime hours, serving as a sort of exposure therapy for those of the population who maintained staunch positions against such lifestyles.
After discussing how sociology defines norms, the competing theories of how social
norms function within society, and how expectations in regards to norms are not always met
(specifically when they are queered), the last item left to address is the rhetorical aspect of social
norms. Talcott Parsons argues in his theory of the socialized actor that the norms people within
a given culture abide by are only effective and influential because they are internalized to the
point that people do not even realize that they are acting in accordance to them. From a rhetorical standpoint, this internalization is considered the ultimate rhetorical achievement: having
individuals act in a certain way and having them believe they are doing it by their own decision.
In Parson’s formulation, the methods by which norms are internalized and persist over time is
due to effective argumentation, or efficient rhetoric. In terms of gender, Judith Butler makes a
relevant point in regards to gender as one of Talcott Parson’s internalized norms:
Gender is, thus, a construction that regularly conceals its genesis; the tacit collective agreement to perform, produce, and sustain discrete and polar genders as
cultural fictions is obscured by the credibility of those productions – and the punishments that attend not agreeing to believe in them; the construction “compels”
our belief in its necessity and naturalness. (Gender Trouble 190)
This section, focusing on what social norms are and how they function in society, is necessary because it predicates the foundation for the following discussion about queer theory and
the ways people queer these social norms to achieve new and different meaning for themselves
and for the norm. In order to fully grasp why people get up in arms when tightly held norms are
queered, it is necessary to cover the basis on which the norms are established and embedded
within society’s collective psyche.
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4

Queer Theory & Queering

Queer theory and the notions of “queering” emerge from a branch of feminism and gender studies that focus on marginalized groups composed of individuals who queer socially constructed norms and institutionalized ideals imposed on the larger public. These norms dictate
acceptable behavior based on ascribed gender. Many scholars -- Judith Butler, J. Jack Halberstam, Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick, and others -- have published regarding the ways in which some
people decide to subvert --or queer -- socially accepted norms and what happens to them and to
the norms themselves when they are queered. Some of the questions that queer theory aims to
answer include: what does it mean to be masculine or feminine? In what ways are these categories culturally based? How do socially constructed institutions dictate the ways people should
dress, speak, and act? What happens when people do not abide by these socially constructed
rules? What, if anything, happens to the individual who is queering? Are they accepted, ostracized, or ignored? Do the social conventions ever change? Will they ultimately disappear?
In her latest book, Gaga Feminism, J. Jack Halberstam asks similar questions. She intends to figure out what would happen if more adults would be open to thinking about gender,
sexual orientation, and the relationship that exists between the two the ways that children do.
She asks:
What if we gendered people according to their behavior? What if gender shifted
over the course of a lifetime – what if someone began life as a boy but became a
boygirl and then a boy/man? What if some males are ladies, some ladies are
butch, some butches are women, some women are gay, some gays are feminine,
some femmes are straight, and some straight people don’t know what they hell is
going on? ... What if we actually started to notice the ways in which race and
sexuality have become hopelessly entangled with notions of the normal and the
perverse, so that we could see the ways in which the white family hide its secrets
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behind thick layers of presumed normativity, while black families in particular
but also Latino and Muslim families are regularly cast as excessive or intolerant,
traditional and behind the times? (Halberstam 8)
The last section examined the implications of social norms and how they manage the daily actions of those operating in society. However, while it is important to realize that these norms
really do exist, even more importantly, it is essential to acknowledge that they are, in fact, socially constructed, and therefore do indeed change and adapt over time.
It is also important to note that it is not only queer people who have the ability to queer
social norms. Feminism, read through gender studies and queer theory lenses, is entirely about
women’s position in an inherently patriarchal society and how they have challenged the socially
constructed norms that once stood in their way. Some pertinent scholarship on this topic comes
from the field of psychology, compliments of Michael Conway and Lenny R. Vartanian and their
co-written piece, “A Status Account of Gender Stereotypes: Beyond Communality and Agency.”
In this article, the authors argue that on two levels – gender and status – women’s stereotypes
are associated with communality and men’s with agency.
In the report of their findings, Conway and Vartanian conclude that women are perceived as having lower status than men, thus having less agency mainly due to their high verbal
passive-aggressiveness, a topic that will be addressed again later. They posit that because of the
way society has built gender stereotypes, if a man were to be whiny and nagging like women can
sometime be perceived, it would not be dubbed whiny and nagging simply because they are
men. Instead, their whiny nags are perceived as legitimate statements of complaint that warrant
action; they are merely exhibiting their agency, whereas women would be perceived as passive
aggressive for the same actions.
The authors also outline the ways that women are reconfiguring their social roles
through status – as women climb the status ladder, approaching men in terms of careers, educa-
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tion, and salary, they are changing the way they perceive themselves and in turn, the way society
perceives them.
Though it is clear that the status of women is changing, I would alter the vocabulary to
rethink this last idea. I would argue that some women, even heterosexual women, have the capacity to queer the social institutions that suppress them, keeping them below men in terms of
status. By queering their roles, they open them up for new meanings to come in and change
things, including their identity. I would argue that the changes in social status that women have
seen over the past decades is primarily due to their changing and subverting the social conventions and norms that they were expected to operate within. By deciding to do something different, to make new meaning to their roles, women changed how they were seen, a transformation
that ultimately allowed them to realize new kinds of identities for themselves.
There are so many examples of these kinds of changes in identities for women: working
outside of the house, earning academic degrees, women’s suffrage, wearing pants and showing
skin, and even choosing to have children without a husband, or an actual, physical male for that
matter. All of these represent the ways that women decided to change how they see themselves,
the modifications they made to the social norms and institutions that told them how to act and
what to wear, resulting in their being able to change their own identities in the end. But it is not
only women who can do this; by queering those institutions that mandate a certain look or action, anyone can create opportunities to make new meanings and new identities for themselves.
J. Jack Halberstam also speaks to this topic of notable changes in our society that have
altered the interpretations of gender over the past several years in Gaga Feminism. She notes:
Just to name a few of the most obvious changes that have impacted our daily experiences of sex and gender, in the late twentieth century and early twenty-first
century, we have seen a massive decline in the prevalence and dominance of monogamous marriage and huge rise in divorce and diverse households. In the
United States, we have also witnessed a new and startling visibility of transgender
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communities and individuals as well as new levels of acceptance for normative
gays and lesbians. Gay marriage is on the horizon and the homo-hetero binary
seems less definitive of sexual orientation than it did at the turn of the last century. (Halberstam xix)
Halberstam’s understanding of how the social institutions of marriage family have changed and
how the acceptance of “normative” gays and lesbians has increased is indicative of how popular
opinions are fluid and have the capacity to change over time. Changes like these happen when
groups or single individuals decide to live in ways that are not congruent with the socially accepted norms. Eventually, the norms change to adapt to the change people push for. Halberstam
ends one part of her discussion of modern family situations by offering her strong opinion about
changing the norms: “If we don’t change the social structures we inherit, we are doomed to repeat them” (57).
This is not to say that social change through queering is without struggle or opposition.
In our society alone, there have been tragic instances of hatred and violence that have cost many
people their lives. In her text, In a Queer Time & Place, Halberstam investigates the outcomes of
such a crime, the execution-style murder of Brandon Teena and his two friends, Lisa Lambert
and Philip DeVine. This story specifically caught the attention of popular media because it was
“a young white person who had been born a woman, but who was living as a man and had been
dating local girls” (Halberstam 23). Unfortunately, some places -- for Halberstam it is rural,
predominately white, middle America – and groups of people find acts of queering to be direct
blows to their beliefs and ways of life. Halberstam argues that the social conventions that Brandon Teena queered threatened the common ideals of masculinity that were popular in the small
town of Falls City, Nebraska:
We might conclude that Brandon lived up to and even played into the romantic
ideals that his girlfriends cultivated about masculinity. Brandon’s selfpresentation must be read, I believe, as a damaging critique of the white working-
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class masculinities around him; at the same time, however, his performance of
courtly masculinity is a shrewd deployment of the middle class and so-called respectable masculinities that represent an American romantic ideal of manhood.
(28)
For the women he dated, how Brandon was able to queer the way he interpreted his own sexuality and present himself was appealing in a way that was notably different from the masculinities
that the “actual” men in the area were able to portray. It was exactly this queering that ultimately threatened these “real” men enough to convince them to take violent action against
Brandon and his friends.
An important element that should not be glossed over when thinking about queering socially constructed norms is the intentional acts that always exist in the background. It is impossible to live and to operate within any society without being aware of what is deemed acceptable
for that particular culture. This is not to say that someone from one part of the world who is
transplanted in an entirely different area will not experience some degree of culture shock, or
that he or she would immediately know all of the intricate ins and outs of their new surroundings. However, if a person is brought up in a certain culture, it would be impossible for that person not to be aware of the social constructions that set the rules for acceptable behavior for its
citizens.
It follows that if a person found him or herself to be queering said social constructions, it
would be an entirely intentional action. The impulses behind the desire to be different, or at
least different from what the social norms dictate from each ascribed gender may or may not be
intentional, or even welcome, but the choice to act on the impulses is deliberate.
The acts of queering social constructions carry with them implications that go beyond
affecting the person who is queering. In fact, queering has the capacity, sometimes positively
and sometimes negatively, to resonate with people or groups of people not at all involved with
the queering of norms. Take for instance, Christian fundamentalist groups that openly and
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loudly announce their opinions against any kind of person or lifestyle that does not entirely mirror the heteronormative ideal they have developed through their interpretation of the Bible. The
Westboro Baptist Church takes it even one step further by placing blame on other branches of
Christianity for the existence and increased acceptability of gay marriage. For these extremists,
by making the decisions to welcome gay, lesbian, and other less-heteronormative individuals
into the folds of their churches, the Christians under attack are going against God’s will and,
therefore, exposing themselves and their followers to the possibility of being eternally damned
(Bennett-Smith 1).
Through that instance alone, it is clear that some people hold onto their beliefs tightly;
this group is willing to bash, berate, and damn to Hell other groups of Christians simply because
they make decisions that they themselves would otherwise not make. Many of these views make
their way into larger society via norms. However, there is a crucial aspect of social norms that
cannot be overlooked: their ability to change – change themselves and those who are queering
them- over time. Changes can happen in at least three different ways. First of all, by queering
norms, those who are actively doing the queering necessitate a change in the norm. Secondly,
when people queer norms, others see them differently, creating the possibility for their opinions
to change, ergo providing more room for the norm to change. Lastly, over time, the norm can
change beyond the point of recognition, or even disappear entirely. In other words, acts of
queering can change socially constructed norms not just for those doing the queering, or even
those who belong to the same communities as those who participate in queering, but for everyone.
The ways that the norms change today’s cultures and in the near future will in turn inform the ways future norms will develop. As per human nature, people will always feel the compulsion to categorize themselves and others in attempts to make sense of everyone’s position
and function within society. It will always be because of this need to put people into groups that
norms will always be a part of daily life for every society. As the chapter on the sociological per-
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spective outlined, the mere existence of social norms is not inherently negative; many sociologists and anthropologists have made the argument that norms are essential for societies to
maintain any semblance of social order. However, when individuals are criticized, ridiculed,
and ostracized when they do not live their life according to these social rules, the consequences
of these actions have harmful implications for those who are doing the queering.
Queer theory as a field of academic study is beginning to get below the surface of the
ways in which socially constructed norms impact the everyday lives of queer people, the people
who observe the norms being queered, and what happens to the norms themselves after being
queered over time. So far, this section has shown that queer theory maintains that what society
considers “feminine” and “masculine” are simply social constructions meant for people to be
able to make sense of their position and the positions of those around them. Ironically, these
social constructions that emerge to help make sense of society ultimately cause more tension
and stress, and ergo more confusion as more and more people speak up about how these constraining and limited categories do not adequately fit the images that they have for themselves.
On one side, queering the norms serves to demonstrate that they are just social constructions that have virtually no value on their own. Conversely, there have also been many cases that
exhibit the potential negative – and often times violent - implications that can come with queering norms; people have been hurt, physically and emotionally, but even those instances will go
toward making changes in public opinion, hopefully changing the norm over time.
As aforementioned, queering these tightly held societal norms and conventions not only
impacts the people doing the queering, but also those around them. Judith Halberstam brings
this up again and again, specifically focusing on it in her work Female Masculinity. At first, the
subject matter of the text, given away by its title, seems counterintuitive; according to popular
opinion – to be female exactly means that one is not masculine. However, Halberstam makes
the argument that this idea of female masculinity represents one of the many facets of gender,
something she views as a range of interpretations and not a strict “one-or-the-other” choice.
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This position makes many people uncomfortable, and Halberstam argues that female masculinity specifically threatens men’s position in larger society. Western society has done a seamless
job of making men’s masculinity the dominant one with all other forms of masculinity becoming
subordinated and made less acceptable.
For Halberstam, as prepubescent children, our ideas of gender fluctuates. This is not to
say that society does not do its best to tell little boys and girls how to act, dress, and speak. Gender queering at a young age is generally ignored or brushed under the rug with the idea that the
child will one day grow out of the “phase,” like, for instance, little girls who are labeled “tomboys.” In this case Halberstam argues:
We could say that tomboysim is tolerated as long as the child remains prepubescent; as soon as puberty begins, however, the full force of gender conformity descends on the girl. [...] It is in the context of female adolescence that the tomboy
instincts of millions of girls are remodeled into complaint forms of femininity.
(Female Masculinity 6)
There is no doubt that society does its best to make sure that every person maintains the attributes that make females “girls/women” and males “boys/men,” but it is becoming more apparent
that the gender binary system in effect is not only outdated but fundamentally flawed.
This project argues that the only way that customs and societal norms are effectively
changed is direct opposition, people taking stances that challenge popular opinion. Halberstam
concurs, but in a slightly different way:
I want to carefully produce a model of female masculinity that remarks on its
multiple forms but also calls for new and self-conscious affirmations of different
gender taxonomies. Such affirmations begin not by subverting masculine power
or taking up a position against masculine power but by turning a blind eye to
conventional masculinities and refusing to engage. (Female Masculinity 9)
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While this approach seems a little more passive, it does offer a method of change that would be
effective. She goes on to suggest that one of the only reasons that our gender binary system has
been sustained over the years is because of how female masculinity threatens men’s masculinity.
But I would argue that while female masculinity does directly threaten the kind of masculinity
men believe should be reserved only for them, it equally threatens women’s position in society:
if masculine females become socially acceptable, where will that leave feminine females? How
should feminine females act toward masculine females?
Halberstam brings this point to the forefront when in her discussion of public restrooms.
She states, “In pubic bathrooms for women, various bathroom users tend to fail to measure up
to expectations of femininity, and those of us who present in some ambiguous way are routinely
questioned and challenged about our presence in the “wrong” bathroom” (Halberstam, Female
Masculinity 20). The mere existence of the distinct bathrooms is in and of itself an obvious indicator of the gender binary system we live by. Individuals have two choices: the men’s room, or
the ladies’ room. Sometimes places will offer a “family” bathroom, but the image that accompanies the stall is almost always the stick figure woman in triangle dress holding a smaller stick
figure’s hand, which implies another societal norm of what “family” is. But back to the two bathroom choices, if I am a masculine female who queers gender in the ways that I dress so that
most people may perceive my outward appearance as more manly, what bathroom do I get to
choose? Perhaps I will get less flack if I use the men’s bathroom, but who is to say that just because I am more masculine than feminine I do not still identify as a woman, and therefore want
to use the women’s bathroom?
On this topic, Halberstam makes two points:
1) “If we use the paradigm of the bathroom as a limit of gender identification, we
can measure the distance between binary gender schema and lived multiple gendered experiences”
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2) “Either we need open-access bathrooms or multigendered bathrooms, or we
need wider parameters for gender identification. The bathroom, as we know it,
actually represents the crumbling edifice of gender in the twentieth century”
(Female Masculinity 23-24).
These points are pertinent to the overall theme of queering gender because they touch on how
seemingly unnoticeable ways society constructs how we operate daily, even down to how choosing what public restroom to use forces us to make one-or-the-other decisions about our own
identity that we may not be comfortable making. Further, the second point demonstrates how
something as basic as the lack of multigendered bathrooms or the over-adoption of singlegendered bathrooms can begin the conversation of trying to deconstruct social norms that constrain the ways that people are supposed to develop their personal identities.
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5

The Rhetoric of Queer

“Here and now, our reality is being rescripted, reshot, reimagined, and if you
don’t go gaga soon, you may wake up and find that you have missed the future and become the past”
– J. Jack Halberstam, Gaga Feminism

The rhetoric of queer presented in this section builds on the notions of queer theory examined in the previous chapter. To review, “a rhetoric of...” as it is used for this research suggests that there exists a set of tenets regarding a group of people and processes that subvert social norms by queering them in ways that changes both the one queering and the norm that is
being queered. In its most basic form, a rhetoric of queer maintains three main principles: 1) by
subverting, or queering, social norms, those who are committing these acts of queering essentially create new meaning of those norms for themselves, 2) the ideas behind social norms as
they relate to gender and the ways people interact with and negotiate with them have evident
rhetorical elements, and 3) that social norms shape the ways we see ourselves and even have
implications for how we use rhetoric and communicate with one another.
To be clear, the way that rhetoric is being used for the purposes of this research is
grounded in the customary canons of rhetoric, specifically the three of invention, style, and delivery. By tradition, rhetoric is the art of speaking and writing effectively in an attempt to reach
an objective, yet it also addresses the ways that behavior can create and execute arguments for
particular purposes, for instance, as represented via acts of queering. Merriam-Webster defines
the queer, in the adjective form, as “questionable, suspicious; differing in some odd way from
what is usual or normal; eccentric, unconventional; mildly insane,” and, in the transitive verb
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form, “to spoil the effect or success of; to put or get into an embarrassing or disadvantageous
situation” (1). This research will only adopt one of these, seeing as how the overwhelming majority of the definitions are tremendously negative in connotation. Therefore, for this work,
queer will be defined generally as a verb meaning to undermine socially constructed and accepted gender conventions. In one of her books, In a Queer Time & Place: Transgender Bodies,
Subcultural Lives, Judith Halberstam states, “’queer’ refers to nonnormative logics and organizations of community, sexual identity, embodiment, and activity in space and time” (6).
An important term that she used in her definition is “nonnormative,” suggesting that the
ways that norms function within society make it seems as though there are ways to operate that
are “normal,” and, more often than not, heteronormative, meaning that the image of an ideal
life would include heterosexual people, couples, and family structures while excluding all of the
other kinds of variations to these constructions that exist. Halberstam addresses this exact point
in her In a Queer Time & Place text as well:
Obviously not all gay, lesbian and transgender people live their lives in radically
different ways from their heterosexual counterparts, but part of what has made
queerness compelling as a form of self-description in the past decade or so has to
do with the way it has the potential to open up new life narratives and alternative
relations to time and space. (2)
In this statement, Halberstam argues that counter to the Merriam-Webster definition of queer,
not every homosexual individual aims to be eccentric or to reverse social norms. Further, the
ability to queer social norms is not a privilege for only gay, lesbian, and transgendered people;
straight people can queer norms just as easily simply by not abiding what society has deemed
acceptable. Some specific examples of how norms can be queered will be investigated later on in
this chapter.
J. Jack Halberstam outlines the first principle beautifully in her text, Gaga Feminism:
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New affiliations between bodies, sex, and power remind us that the categories of
being that seemed to specify and define human nature over one hundred years
ago have quickly become rather inadequate placeholders for identity. While
“male” and “female” are categories crumbling under the weight of revision [...].
Rather than fixing these categories and institutions, feminist and queer theory
should be giving them a good shove into the muck. (67)
The ideals and notions that the social norms prescribe and proscribe for each and every person
no longer work for the kinds of identities people are creating for themselves. They are outdated.
They do not represent all of the variations of gender that people have developed and continue to
develop everyday. The ways that people can queer social norms are endless, and as mentioned
earlier, acts of queering are not at all limited to members of the gay and lesbian communities.
Halberstam cites Judith Butler and Michele Foucault in her discussion of queering
norms, stating, “Foucault, and Butler for that matter, clearly believe that resistance has to go
beyond the taking of a name (‘I am a lesbian’), and must produce creative new forms of being by
assuming and empowering a marginal positionality” (53). She is using these prominent scholars
in the field of feminist and queer theories to support the idea that through queering, or “resistance” as she coins it, individuals who find themselves in a marginalized position need to turn
that position on its head, reclaim it, and make a new meaning of it for themselves. She goes on
to say, “Accordingly, we should take over the prerogative of naming our experience and identifications” (Halberstam 53). This is exactly the point of queering: allowing people who live outside
the boundaries of the accepted social norms to eliminate the power that the norms have over
them, take the wind out of the sails of the negative opposition that aims to squash them, and either remake the norms in ways that encompass them, or destroy the norms altogether.
The ways that people can queer socially constructed norms are truly endless. All it takes
is a person not acting in one hundred percent compliance with the rules that the social norm
dictates for individuals’ behavior. One example that J. Halberstam investigates at length in her
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text Gaga Feminism is the institution of marriage. Initially she uses this example to demonstrate how norms and socially constructed norms change over time, arguing that young people
are growing up in societies where divorce is just a common as staying together, and people are
looking for different kinds of family structures that could potentially fit better for them. As for
the children who are raised in these atypical family units, Halberstam states, “it is this generation of kids – kids growing up in the age of divorce, queer parenting, and economic collapse –
who will probably recognize, name, and embrace new modes of gender and sexuality within a
social environment that has changed their meaning forever” (Gaga Feminism xxi). In her approach, Halberstam suggests that perhaps by queering the social norms in one area – like marriage and parental strategies – it could lead to changes in people themselves who would then
been more open to and engaged with changing the current social norms.
Halberstam continues the argument that children raised in the current social environment that is less reticent toward atypical family units have a greater chance of being more open
toward varied situations than people of earlier generations. She furthers this train of thought by
suggesting that today’s young people who are raised in such family structures “might learn about
gendered forms of power untethered to gender hierarchies” (Halberstam 58). In other words,
the next generation will be better equipped and more willing to create and embrace new ways of
interpreting and expressing gender, if notions of gender still exist at all.
Halberstam makes a similar point later in the text using the popular animated children’s
movie, Finding Nemo. In the story, a character named Dory, interestingly voiced by Ellen DeGeneres, a famous daytime talk host who is also an out and proud lesbian, as described by Halberstam, is the “forgetful fish who can only remember things for five minutes [...], is able to find
the missing Nemo, navigate the way across the Pacific, speak whale, and lead a fish uprising
against fisherman” (Gaga Feminism 128). In her adventures with Marlon, Nemo’s father, trying
to find the little fish in the big, big ocean, Dory’s character is set as the presumed romantic opposite of him, yet the relationship never comes to fruition. Halberstam draws an interesting
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conclusion about this, and turns it into a message for the rest of us: “She [Dory] literally forgets
family, forgets to get married, forgets to become a mother, and in the process opens herself up to
a new way of being. I suggest we do the same” (Gaga Feminism 129). Clearly the probability of
the general public one day “forgetting” to get married and uphold the heteronormative, nuclear
family units that are all too familiar is slim, but that does not mean that it is impossible for us
try to do what Halberstam proposes and try to be more welcoming of change.
As aforementioned, it is not just social institutions that can be rhetorically altered
through acts of queering. More basic, foundational norms, like gender, can be queered as well.
Judith Butler maintains in her text, Gender Trouble, the following position regarding the topic
of a socially constructed binary gender system:
The presumption of a binary gender system implicitly retains the belief of a binary in a mimetic relation of gender to sex whereby gender mirrors sex or is otherwise restricted by it. When the constructed status of gender is theorized as
radically independent of sex, gender itself becomes a free-floating artifice, with
the consequence that man and masculine might just as easily signify a female
body as a male one, and woman and feminine a male body as easily as a female
one. (9)
Through Butler, along with many other scholars in feminist and queer theory, it is apparent that
such a binary gender system is purely social construction meant to aid in making sense of how
people fit into society. Yet, as the number of individuals who do not identify with one gender,
the other, or neither increases the need for a new way of thinking beyond the two-branch gender
structure also increases. In Gaga Feminism, Halberstam asserts, “gender categories always
threaten to run wild, and with every shift and change in cultural meaning and mores, endless
new possibilities emerge for love, life, and liberation” (93). Again, Halberstam hits the nail on
the head; this last point she makes is exactly what a rhetoric of queer aims to get at.
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Halberstam goes on to argue that there are three specific reasons why the gender binary
system should be rethought: the gender binary system is (a) dangerous, (b) not necessary, and
(c) not actually consistent with lived reality” (Gaga Feminism 10). These socially constructed
genders are dangerous because they attempt to force individuals to choose between only two
rigid categories, when in reality gender is a fluid element that has difficulty staying within the
boundaries the genders “man” and “woman” prop up. The genders are not necessary because
they do not have any kind of inherent value; they only become valuable when society makes
them that way.
Here is another time when the notion of public restrooms comes up: some might reason
that some genders are necessary for things like public restrooms. Many people may feel uncomfortable if they had to share a public restroom with someone that they did not identify as part of
their “category.” Even the former argument is flawed because it is based on how one person’s
interpretation of his or her gender makes another person feel, which is irrational. To this point,
Halberstam and Butler have the right idea: if adults could be as accepting of those of us who
choose to not comply with societal norms as children are, the notions, norms, negative feelings,
everything that supports the binary gender system would lose significant value and clout, rendering it meaningless.
Unfortunately, that is not how our society operates today. Whether it is in accordance
with socially prescribed norms, against them, or somewhere in between, we all make cognitive
decisions for ourselves with them in mind. Each and every one of us wakes up in the morning
and decides how we are going to present ourselves to the rest of society. The ways we do this is a
form of rhetoric, performed through different rhetorical acts. Specifically, the means through
which people create their identities and present them to the outside world represent three of the
traditional canons of rhetoric: invention, delivery, and style. Aristotle’s On Rhetoric offers a detailed outline of each of these elements of rhetoric. For invention, Aristotle lists all the available
“means of persuasion,” which he categorizes into different topics a rhetorician could potentially
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use to compose an effective argument. Delivery and style focus more on the performative sides
of presenting an argument in ways that would build the speaker’s ethos, or credibility with his or
her audience.
Though it is not written argument, the ways each of us performs our version of gender is
counted as a rhetorical performance, our way of situating ourselves amongst the rest of society.
We deliver ourselves to the surrounding world through the ways we dress, the language we use,
and the lifestyles we choose to live. There are those who choose to live their lives congruently
with socially accepted norms – dressing according to their ascribed gender, being in heterosexual relationships, etc – and for the most part, society leaves them alone. For those who choose to
live not according to what society deems acceptable, to subvert those conventions imposed on
the public through society, there is a greater risk of ridicule, ostracism, and even death.
When we make decisions about how to dress, act, or speak, the decision-making process
represents invention. This process involves being aware of the social norms that govern how
genders should act, speak, dress and either making the deliberate choice to live congruently or
in some kind of opposition to them. Through this process of invention, people develop the kind
of image that they wish others to see. Generally speaking, this practice is simple, especially for
those who identify with heteronormative norms. People procure various pieces of clothing that
they find attractive and they wear them however they want to, they wear their hair in a way they
like best, and they ultimately present themselves how they wish to be seen. These kinds of
choices are personal and, in theory, should not be influenced by any external elements, though it
almost never happens.
However, when individuals do not feel as though the norms that dictate acceptable appearances for the two genders accurately portray how they see themselves, the process of inventing an identity becomes more complicated. People who find themselves in this position expose
themselves to the strange looks and mistaken gender when they are in public, which is sometimes motivation enough to try to swallow discomfort and force-fit themselves into the molds of
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social norms. However, as mentioned earlier when the institution of marriage was discussed,
when the norms are ignored, it opens up the realm of possibilities to make new meaning.
Take the instance of choosing clothing: a person who was born female does not believe
that the gender of “woman” adequately suits how she sees herself. Logically it would follow that
she would not buy the clothes that were designed for women, but now she gets to choose whatever she wants to wear without being constricted by the strong suggestions from social norms:
“No, you shouldn’t wear those, they are for men,” “Women your age are wearing these this season,” etc. Quite literally she can choose whatever she feels properly encompasses the image she
has for herself.
Once her decisions are made, she moves onto the delivery and style portions of her argument. Most rhetoricians would agree that these two canons of traditional rhetoric are more
focused on how the argument is presented as opposed to what the argument is composed of or
how it is arranged. The delivery of an argument is perhaps more important than the argument
itself; the most well reasoned position can be rendered ineffective if the person presenting the
argument cannot come through on delivery. For Aristotle, delivery is of the utmost importance.
In listing the canons and their roles in constructing effective argumentation, he suggests, “and
third is something that has the greatest force [...], the matter of delivery” (Aristotle 195). Fortunately, there is really no right or wrong way to deliver one’s self-image. In fact, the only way that
a person could fail at successfully delivering the argument of his or her self-image would be to
not fully live up to how they truly see themselves.
In term of style, much of the same can be said as was about delivery: it is about details in
how the argument is presented that are important to the style. Style is one of those universal notions meaning that it pertains to the small intricacies, the details that make the argument unique
to the speaker, or in the case, whoever is presenting their version of themselves. In other words,
for the purposes of the presenting gender as an argument position, the three rhetorical canons
would be as follows:
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–

Invention represents the processes that everyone goes through to determine how they
want to interpret socially constructed norms in order to create a version of themselves
that best fits how they see themselves.

–

Delivery is the way that people enact what they came up with during their invention
processes as demonstrated through their dress, language, and/or behavior

–

Style is the finishing details on the delivery that makes it distinct to that person, the subtle alterations and interpretations someone might incorporate into their personal presentation of themselves.

The concepts of audience and context are also important in the field of rhetoric, though they are
not part of the rhetorical canon. Traditional rhetorical training teaches that every argument
should be tailored appropriately depending on the audience and context. The same could be applied to developing and delivering one’s personal identity, with the audience and context always
changing. There is no doubt that norms exist for different places and situations – the contexts –
and for different people. For instance, people tend to dress differently for a wedding versus a
funeral, church versus a nightclub, or a food truck versus a five-star restaurant. Further, there
are norms about what can and cannot be said at a dinner party, in a movie theater, or at Temple.
All of these elements are components in how each one of us shapes our identities, negotiating
with unsolicited norms that aim to direct how we present ourselves to everyone else in how we
dress and our overall appearance, even to what we say to whom, when, where, and how we say
it.
Judith Butler’s Gender Trouble is a text that argues several essential elements that directly inform this idea of delivering one’s gender through her notions of gender performativity.
This is the idea that each and every individual works to “do” his or her gender, as through delivery: a person delivers his or her version of gender by the way he or she dresses, how he or she
uses language, and the characteristics he or she presents to the rest of the world. In her own
words, Butler argues:
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Such acts, gestures, enactments, generally construed, are performative in the
sense that the essence or identity that they otherwise purport to express are fabrications manufactured and sustained through corporeal signs and other discursive means. That the gendered body is performative suggests that it has no ontological status apart from the various acts that constitute reality. (185)
According to Butler and as outlined earlier, gender really does not have any meaning, or rather it
is socially constructed instead of biologically mandated, nor does it really exist without the ways
in which it is performed.
J. Jack Halberstam combines these thoughts with a hope for the future. In Gaga Feminism, when she is discussing the possibility of upcoming children who are being raised in nonnormative family structures, she anticipates that these young people “might understand gender
as something that someone does rather than something some is” (Halberstam 58).
The dynamics of actually queering traditional gender roles essentially represents a person’s “delivery” of their own interpretation of gender, to use rhetorical jargon. It is exactly how
Halberstam stated above, it is much less about what a person’s gender is than it is about how a
person does –or does not do - the gender he or she identifies with most. While there is any
number of ways to queer gender, usually this myriad of ways can be subdivided into two categories. The first of these is subverting traditional gender norms by fully adopting them in a same
sex context. Think of the dynamic of a butch/femme lesbian relationship for instance. In a relationship like this, traditional masculinity and femininity may be upheld almost completely with
the only subversion being that two females rather than the traditional male and female couple
are enacting those roles.
The other category of queering gender is to subvert traditional gender roles by adopting
and deleting desired traits from both traditional gender roles within the same person. Take for
example a male-bodied person who chooses to grow a beard and wear dresses and skirts. In this
way, gender is queered by highlighting the strictures of socialization to traditional roles. Again,
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it is important to note that these kinds of subversions are not limited to those who identify as
gay, lesbian, or bisexual. There are plenty of instances where people choose to queer gender but
still maintain a heterosexual lifestyle.
Within these two categories, there are a few specific ways to think about how individuals
might queer gender. From the first category, in which the queering happens through subversion
of traditional gender roles, the list includes: butch/femme lesbian relationships, butch/femme
gay relationships, and both drag queens and kings. From the second category, where the queering happens through subversion by transcending traditional gender roles, the list includes: gender queer – those who feel they are both genders at once or neither gender at all, two spirits – a
term used by indigenous North Americans to describe those who fill mixed gender roles, and
androgyny – a term meaning limiting the expression of any type of gender. The point of fleshing
out the ways in which people can queer gender is to accentuate the notion that gender is a deliberate and rhetorical act rather than simply something that is ascribed or a choice made at puberty.
All of the categories listed above are portrayed through the act of what Butler calls “doing
gender.” This can be done in any number of sublet and nuanced ways that include but are not
limited to a person’s style of dress, makeup and accessories, the way the body is held or how a
person moves, the style and timbre of speech, the social roles a person fills, and the way a person
relates to his or her partner. Several of these methods of queering relate back to the ancient days
of Greece and Rome where young men were trained in rhetoric to hold themselves in specific
ways and to speak in a manner that would give the impression of a developed and refined character. All of these things are rhetorical, rhetoric in action. There is a certain style and pitch of
speech that is commonly associated with homosexual males, just like there is a style of dress and
mannerisms associated with butch women, or women who enact Halberstam’s female masculinity. These last couple examples may sound stereotypical, and they are; however, their purpose
here is not to say that all gay men style their voices the same or that all butch women dress alike.
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Rather, they demonstrate a couple of ways that style – another component of the rhetorical
canon – comes into play in a very significant way in terms of doing gender.
The idea of doing gender goes beyond the norms that determine what is acceptable for
dress and behavior, but the same can be applied to how people use language. Several scholars
have investigated the ways the different genders use language, looking for patterns that might
hold the key to better communication for us all. Interestingly enough, one of the most notable
points of consensus among all of the scholarship dealing with the ways men and women use rhetorical strategies and language is that there are prominent differences between them. This is
significant because the gender binary system is entirely socially constructed, making the research and studies published regarding differences between the genders based wholly on social
constructions that would otherwise not exist.
One noteworthy text published on this topic is Deborah Tannen’s You Just Don’t Understand: Women and Men in Conversation. Focusing her study on how men and women communicate, making note of the differences in how each gender uses language, Tannen argues that the
reasons why men and women have difficulties understanding each other in conversation originate from the differences in subconscious goals and worldviews that each gender maintains. According to her, men view each conversation as a competition through which they locate themselves on the overarching hierarchy of themselves and other men, whereas women use language
to reach consensus and to enable the formation of relationships.
In her work, Tannen speaks to the major differences between the ways that men and
women enter conversations with one another, each with different – sometimes conflicting –
goals, and how the two genders actually speak differently. She goes as far as to assert “that many
frictions arise because boys and girls grow up in what are essentially different cultures, so talk
between women and men is cross-cultural communication” (Tannen 18). She notes the major
differences between the genders and identifies that perhaps the differences lie in the ways boys
and girls are brought up in society, but she does not touch on the fact that society has created
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the genders in the first place. How does that affect the reading of this work? What happens when
a biological woman who seems to identify somewhere between no gender and masculine wants
to “talk like a man”?
Tannen touches on this briefly when she addresses women beginning to gain access to
positions of authority and having to relearn ways of talking like men in order earn respect. But
even trying to emulate masculine communication techniques does not always get the job done,
as Tannen notes: “Apart from the repugnance of women’s having to do all the changing, this
doesn’t work either, because women who talk like men are judged differently – and harshly”
(18). This kind of judgment happens because the woman who is imitating masculine ways of
communicating is violating socially constructed norms, which can make people uncomfortable.
Elizabeth Aries is another prominent figure in the field of gender and communications.
In her piece “Gender and Communication,” Aries’ research aims to uncover the ways that the
change in gender roles since the 1950s has impacted the ways that researchers look at how gender influences communication. In her findings, Aries reiterates that there are clear differences in
the ways that men and women use language. She insists that by using newly developed methods
and methodologies to get a closer look into the actual ways that the genders communicate will
help researchers get a better grasp on how to accurately understand communication and help
avoid miscommunication between men and women in the future.
On that same note, two other scholars, Deborah James and Janice Drakich, conducted a
review of studies that focused on gender differences in the amount of talk performed by both
genders. They examined sixty-three studies covering 1951-1991 that researched the talk time of
the genders seeking to answer the question of why women are stereotyped as talking significantly more than men. In their conclusion, James and Drakich suggest that a newer approach,
one that bases itself in sociological studies that examines the social context and expectations of
those participating in the conversation interaction – or the sociological perspective of status
characteristics theory – should be expounded upon. Overall, they argue:
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The behaviors [of men and women] are best explained in terms of the social
structure of the interaction; this is informed by the difference in status between
the genders and the differential culture expectations about men’s and women’s
abilities and areas of competence (James 301).
This quotation is significant for two specific reasons: 1) it identifies that there is a sense
of social construction behind the ways that men and women communicate, and 2) it addresses
the notion of cultural expectations, an idea brought up in the “Queer Theory” chapter of this
work that furthers the argument that social norms deliberately aim to influence individuals’ behavior.
While this meta-analysis does recognize the implications of social norms on the ways
that men and women use language, it still does not expressly mention that the genders themselves are social constructions. However, as previously noted, it does acknowledge the expectations that norms placed upon society, and it goes one step further to suggest that the expectations have to do with the distinct genders and their assumed “abilities and competence,” which
implies how the norms infiltrate contexts of what people, regardless of sex or gender, can or
cannot do. Gender stereotypes are built on judgments like these; obviously there are basic genetic characteristics that are specific to each biological sex; however, stereotypes are, by definition, infamous for drawing conclusions of an entire group based on the qualities of only a few
and they almost never account for exceptions.
Overall, there is no doubt that there are different ways that people who identify with the
heteronormative gender binary system use rhetoric and language. But there are also those cases
where someone might not identify with his or her ascribed gender, yet he or she still exhibits
communication characteristics known to one of the genders. Further, it would be an oversight to
forget to mention those people who separate themselves entirely from the gender binary system
by refusing to use gender pronouns to refer to themselves and request that others follow suit
when they address them. As with queering other socially constructed norms, there are infinite
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ways people can queer language norms. As a result, it would seem a better fit to configure a
categorical system to identify language using characteristics that has nothing to do with gender
at all. If, as a society, we feel the compulsion to have to have an organizing system to be able to
make sense of our positions and the positions of those around us, why not develop a process of
classification that, instead, focuses on grouping people together based on their use rhetorical
turns and other language use that has no ties to gender whatsoever?
Socially constructed norms have been part of what has made societies function since the
inception of modern societies thousands of years ago. They aim to help streamline people’s behaviors to create cohesive cohabiting and, generally, they work at a subconscious level where
people barely realize they are adapting their behavior based on them. As discussed, there are
several theories about the ways that norms emerge and are maintained, from theories of socialized actors, internalization, and even peer pressure; ultimately, while it is important to know
how and why these constructions work, the overall point is that they do have real-life implications, and, in terms of gender norms, lately they are becoming more and more constraining, resulting in overwhelming destructive and even tragic consequences. It is time that these norms
are changed to reflect the various kinds of people living in our society, but such change does not
happen overnight. Significant change will be painful and jarring, and many people will be resistant to it, but there really is no stopping change. J. Jack Halberstam sums it up beautifully,
boldly stating:
Future shocks are on the horizon, and instead of trying to prevent more damage,
we should be hoping that one particularly powerful tremor might bring the whole
crumbling edifice of normative sex and gender crumbling down. (Gaga Feminism
82)
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